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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals, MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

B5

FILE:

SRC-07-219-50705

Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date:

APR 13 2010

IN RE:

Petitioner:
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant visa petition, which is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a software development and consulting company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a software engineer pursuant to section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2). As required by statute, a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification (Form ETA 750), approved by the Department of Labor (DOL), accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief and additional evidence and asserts that the director failed to properly consider the additional financial documentation and information presented as to the petitioner's true financial ability to pay the proffered wage.

The record shows that the appeal is properly and timely filed, and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

The Form ETA 750 was accepted on August 14, 2001 and certified on September 20, 2006 initially on behalf of the original beneficiary.¹ The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is

¹ The original copy of the labor certification filed and certified on behalf of the original beneficiary is in the record. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) records do not contain any I-140 immigrant petition filed and approved on behalf of the original beneficiary based on the instant labor certification.

\$73,600 per year. The Form I-140 petition on behalf of the instant beneficiary was submitted on July 9, 2007. The instant petition is for a substituted beneficiary.² On the petition the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1997, to have a gross annual income of \$4,000,000, to have a net annual income of \$250,000, and to currently employ 33 workers. With the petition the petitioner submitted a Form ETA 750B with information pertaining to the qualifications of the new beneficiary. On the Form ETA 750B signed by the beneficiary on July 6, 2007, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a de novo basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule.”); *see also*, *Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp.*, NTSB, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO’s de novo authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.³

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of a Form ETA 750 establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the Form ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer

² We note that the case involves the substitution of a beneficiary on the labor certification. Substitution of beneficiaries was permitted by the Department of Labor (DOL) at the time of filing this petition. DOL had published an interim final rule, which limited the validity of an approved labor certification to the specific alien named on the labor certification application. *See* 56 Fed. Reg. 54925, 54930 (October 23, 1991). The interim final rule eliminated the practice of substitution. On December 1, 1994, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, acting under the mandate of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in *Kooritzky v. Reich*, 17 F.3d 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1994), issued an order invalidating the portion of the interim final rule, which eliminated substitution of labor certification beneficiaries. The *Kooritzky* decision effectively led 20 C.F.R. §§ 656.30(c)(1) and (2) to read the same as the regulations had read before November 22, 1991, and allow the substitution of a beneficiary. Following the *Kooritzky* decision, DOL processed substitution requests pursuant to a May 4, 1995 DOL Field Memorandum, which reinstated procedures in existence prior to the implementation of the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90). DOL delegated responsibility for substituting labor certification beneficiaries to USCIS based on a Memorandum of Understanding, which was recently rescinded. *See* 72 Fed. Reg. 27904 (May 17, 2007) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 656). DOL’s final rule became effective July 16, 2007 and prohibits the substitution of alien beneficiaries on permanent labor certification applications and resulting certifications. As the filing of the instant case predates the rule, substitution will be allowed for the present petition. An I-140 petition for a substituted beneficiary retains the same priority date as the original ETA 750. Memo. from Luis G. Crocetti, Associate Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, to Regional Directors, *et al.*, Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Substitution of Labor Certification Beneficiaries*, at 3, http://ows.doleta.gov/dmstree/fm/fm96/fm_28-96a.pdf (March 7, 1996).

³ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner submits the beneficiary's W-2 form and paystubs. The beneficiary's W-2 form for 2007 shows that the petitioner paid the beneficiary \$5,184.00 in 2007. The beneficiary's paystubs for 2008 show that the petitioner paid the beneficiary at level of approximately \$10,000.00 per month and the beneficiary's year-to-date earnings as of March 20, 2008 were \$30,873.60. Therefore, the petitioner established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage in 2008, however, the petitioner must demonstrate that it had sufficient net income to pay the full proffered wage in 2001 through 2006 and the difference of \$68,416.00 between wages actually paid the beneficiary and the proffered wage in 2007.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner's revenues and payroll indicated in the petitioner's letter and its certified public accountant (CPA)'s letter should be considered in determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Counsel's reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income.

The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 116. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner’s ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner was structured as a C corporation and selected as an S corporation in 2003. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner’s fiscal year is based on calendar year. The record contains the petitioner’s federal income tax returns for 2001 through 2007. As previously discussed, the petitioner has established its ability to pay the instant beneficiary the proffered wage in 2008 through the examination of wages actually paid to the beneficiary. The petitioner’s tax returns demonstrate its net income for 2001 through 2007, as shown in the table below.

- In 2001, the Form 1120 stated net income⁴ of \$41,840.
- In 2002, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$67,631.
- In 2003, the Form 1120S stated net income⁵ of \$74,794.

⁴ For a C corporation, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 28 of the Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return.

⁵ Where an S corporation’s income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner’s IRS Form 1120S. However,

- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$107,087.
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$66,061.
- In 2006, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$70,671.
- In 2007, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$68,730.

Therefore, for the years 2003 and 2004, the petitioner had sufficient net income to pay the instant beneficiary the full proffered wage and for 2007, the petitioner's net income was sufficient to pay the difference of \$68,416.00 between wages actually paid the instant beneficiary and the proffered wage that year. However, for the years 2001, 2002, 2005 and 2006, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the instant beneficiary the proffered wage.

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁶ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets for 2001, 2002, 2005 and 2006 as shown below.

- In 2001, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$100,928.
- In 2002, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$179,364.
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of (\$3,311).
- In 2006, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$9,542.

For the years 2001 and 2002, the petitioner had sufficient net current assets to pay the instant beneficiary the proffered wage, however, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage in 2005 and 2006.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the instant beneficiary the proffered wage

where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 23 (2003), line 17e (2004-2005) or line 18 (2006) of Schedule K. See Instructions for Form 1120S, 2006, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed on February 3, 2010) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholder's shares of the corporation's income, deductions, credits, etc.).

⁶ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

On appeal, counsel asserts that financial statements for the petitioner demonstrate sufficient funds to pay the proffered wage. The unaudited financial statements submitted in response to the director's request for evidence are not persuasive evidence. According to the plain language of 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), where the petitioner relies on financial statements as evidence of a petitioner's financial condition and ability to pay the proffered wage, those statements must be audited. Unaudited statements are the unsupported representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not persuasive evidence of a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In addition, the petitioner's tax returns were prepared pursuant to cash convention, in which revenue is recognized when it is received, and expenses are recognized when they are paid. This office would, in the alternative, have accepted tax returns prepared pursuant to accrual convention, if those were the tax returns the petitioner had actually submitted to the Internal Revenue Services (IRS).

This office is not, however, persuaded by an analysis in which the petitioner, or anyone on its behalf, seeks to rely on tax returns or financial statements prepared pursuant to one method, but then seeks to shift revenue or expenses from one year to another as convenient to the petitioner's present purpose. If revenues are not recognized in a given year pursuant to the cash accounting then the petitioner, whose taxes are prepared pursuant to cash rather than accrual, and who relies on its tax returns in order to show its ability to pay the proffered wage, may not use those revenues as evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage during that year. Similarly, if expenses are recognized in a given year, the petitioner may not shift those expenses to some other year in an effort to show its ability to pay the proffered wage pursuant to some hybrid of accrual and cash accounting. The amounts shown on the petitioner's tax returns shall be considered as they were submitted to the IRS, not as amended pursuant to the accountant's adjustments. If the accountant wished to persuade this office that accrual accounting supports the petitioners continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, then the accountant was obliged to prepare and submit audited financial statements pertinent to the petitioning business prepared according to generally accepted accounting principles.

On appeal counsel submits a letter from the petitioner's bank regarding the average balance the petitioner maintained in its business checking account. However, counsel's reliance on the balance in the petitioner's bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, any funds used in one month would no longer be available in future months. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the cash specified on Schedule L

considered above in determining the petitioner's net current assets. The petitioner has not demonstrated that any other funds were available to pay the proffered wage.

Moreover, if the instant petition were the only petition filed by the petitioner, the petitioner would be required to produce evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage to the single beneficiary of the instant petition. However, where a petitioner has filed multiple petitions for multiple beneficiaries which have been pending or approved simultaneously, the petitioner must produce evidence that its job offers to each beneficiary are realistic, and therefore, that it has the ability to pay the proffered wages to each of the beneficiaries of its pending and approved petitions, as of the priority date of each petition and continuing until the beneficiary of each petition obtains lawful permanent residence. *See Mater of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977) (petitioner must establish ability to pay as of the date of the Form MA 7-50B job offer, the predecessor to the Form ETA 750 and ETA Form 9089). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

In the instant case, the petitioner has filed additional Immigrant Petitions for Alien Worker (Form I-140) for 32 workers. Among these 32 immigrant petitions, one of the approvals was revoked, two petitions were denied, two are still pending and 27 petitions were approved. For those approved petitions, the petitioner is obligated to demonstrate its ability to pay each of them the proffered wages during the partial or whole period of years 2001 through 2007.⁷ Therefore, the petitioner

⁷ USCIS records show that the petitioner filed total 152 immigrant and nonimmigrant petitions in recent years. Among the 33 immigrant petitions the petitioner filed, one was initially approved but later revoked, two petitions were denied, two of them are still pending with USCIS, and 27 were approved. Counsel submitted copies of the 16 approvals and pertinent documents in response to the director's request for evidence. The detailed information about the additional 11 approved immigrant petitions is as follows:

- WAC-05-088-51039 filed on February 4, 2005 with the priority date of April 3, 2002, and approved on June 8, 2005.
- WAC-05-228-51175 filed on August 16, 2005 with the priority date of June 7, 2002, and approved on January 31, 2006.
- SRC-07-061-52028 filed on December 28, 2006 with the priority date of November 29, 2006, and approved on January 9, 2007.
- SRC-07-800-10748 filed on April 17, 2007 with the priority date of November 7, 2006, and approved on October 6, 2007.
- LIN-07-262-51494 filed on August 8, 2007 with the priority date of July 19, 2007, and approved on June 17, 2008.
- LIN-07-269-50235 filed on August 13, 2007 with the priority date of November 21, 2006, and approved on July 5, 2008.
- LIN-08-096-50850 filed on February 7, 2008 with the priority date of October 30, 2007, and approved on March 27, 2009.
- LIN-08-142-50836 filed on April 14, 2008 with the priority date of January 31, 2008, and approved on May 11, 2009.
- LIN-08-152-51296 filed on April 25, 2008 with the priority date of December 18, 2007, and approved on October 1, 2008.
- LIN-09-185-50984 filed on June 29, 2009 with the priority date of November 5, 2008, and approved on September 9, 2009.

would need to demonstrate its ability to pay 2 proffered wages in 2001, 6 in 2002, 8 in 2003, 11 in 2004, 12 in 2005, 18 in 2006 and 21 in 2007 in addition to the instant beneficiary.

In response to the director's request for evidence, counsel submitted documents showing that the petitioner has already paid the partial or full proffered wages to some of the approved beneficiaries in some relevant years. The AAO concurs with counsel's assertion. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed all beneficiaries at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. However, counsel only submitted and calculated the proffered wages for 16 of the 27 beneficiaries and the documentary evidence in the record shows that during the relevant years, the petitioner paid one of the 12 full proffered wages it must to pay in 2005, four of the 18 in 2006 and nine of the 21 in 2007. The petitioner failed to establish that it paid the full proffered wages to each of the beneficiaries of the approved petitions as of the priority date of each petition and continuing until the beneficiary of each petition obtains lawful permanent residence.

As previously discussed, in 2001 the petitioner had net current assets of \$100,928 which were sufficient to pay the instant beneficiary the full proffered wage, but which were insufficient to pay the additional proffered wages to the beneficiaries of the approved petitions. In 2002, the petitioner's net current assets of \$179,364 were insufficient to pay six additional full proffered wages. In 2003, the net current assets of \$244,367 were insufficient to pay eight additional full proffered wages. In 2004, the petitioner had net income of \$107,087 which was still insufficient to pay additional 11 proffered wages. The petitioner did not have sufficient funds to pay a single proffered wage in 2005 and 2006, therefore, it failed to establish that it had sufficient funds to pay 11 additional proffered wages in 2005, and 14 additional proffered wages in 2006. In 2007, the petitioner's net income was barely sufficient to pay the difference between wages actually paid to the instant beneficiary and the proffered wage that year. Moreover, the record contains no evidence that the petitioner had additional funds to pay 12 proffered wages or the differences between wages actually paid to the approved beneficiaries and proffered wages in 2007. In 2008, the petitioner established its ability to pay the instant beneficiary the full proffered wage via wages actually paid, however, counsel did not submit the petitioner's tax return, annual report or audited financial statements for 2008 or any documentary evidence showing that the petitioner paid the full proffered wages to the 14 beneficiaries for whom the petitioner was obligated to establish its ability to pay.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiaries the proffered wages as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonagawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612

(BIA 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, given the record as a whole, the petitioner's history of filing immigrant and nonimmigrant petitions, the AAO must also take into account the petitioner's ability to pay the petitioner's wages in the context of its overall recruitment efforts. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wages.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.